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Abstract
Analogue experiments have attracted interest for their potential to shed light on inac-
cessible domains. For instance, ‘dumb holes’ in fluids and Bose-Einstein condensates,
as analogues of black holes, have been promoted as means of confirming the existence of
Hawking radiation in real black holes. We compare analogue experiments with other
cases of experiment and simulation in physics. We argue—contra recent claims in
the philosophical literature—that analogue experiments are not capable of confirming
the existence of particular phenomena in inaccessible target systems. As they must
assume the physical adequacy of the modelling framework used to describe the in-
accessible target system, arguments to the conclusion that analogue experiments can
yield confirmation for phenomena in those target systems, such as Hawking radiation
in black holes, beg the question.
Keywords: Analogy; Black Hole Thermodynamics; Hawking Radiation; Dumb Holes;
Quantum Gravity; Analogue Reasoning.
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1 Introduction: analogue gravity
Quantum gravity—the field of physics centred around the (currently unknown) theory that
is required in order to describe the domains where both quantum and general relativistic ef-
fects are thought to be non-trivial—is notorious for its lack of experimental or observational
data. Thus, the development of theories in this domain turns on theoretical considerations,
contended over in an empirical vacuum. In this context, black holes have been hailed as
the Rosetta Stone which supposedly furnishes the combination of relativistic and quantum
effects that will lead the way to quantum gravity. This hope is based on results in black
hole thermodynamics, which rests on a suggestive analogy between the laws of ordinary
thermodynamics and the so-called ‘black hole thermodynamic laws’ (Kiefer, 2007, 206). The
analogy relates quantities such as surface gravity and horizon area defined in terms of the
basic properties of black holes (their mass, charge, and angular momentum) to thermo-
dynamic properties such as temperature and entropy. When Bekenstein (1972, 1973) first
proposed the analogy, it was not taken seriously—for good reason: a classical black hole as it
is described in general relativity is a perfect absorber and must thus be of zero temperature,
despite its non-zero surface curvature. Consequently, the analogy was initially taken as a
mere formal curiosity with no physical meaning.1
The situation drastically changed when Hawking (1975) showed how semi-classical con-
siderations, i.e. calculations based partly on relativistic and partly on quantum physics, can
lead to a form of thermal radiation being apparently emitted from black holes. The ex-
istence of this ‘Hawking radiation’ made an assignment of a genuine physical temperature
TH to black holes meaningful. Strikingly, it turns out that TH is proportional to the black
hole’s surface gravity, κ, and so fits the role of temperature in the black hole thermodynamic
laws: as dS ∝ dA in the analogy—i.e., (infinitesimal) entropy, dS, is proportional to the
(infinitesimal) black hole horizon area, dA—, TH ∝ κ allows for the right relationship be-
tween temperature and entropy, that is, TdS = κ
8piG
dA (where G is Newton’s gravitational
constant). Thus, now following Bekenstein, most physicists seem to have accepted that the
association between black holes and thermodynamic systems is not just one of a physically
meaningful analogy; instead, they conclude that black holes are thermodynamic objects, and
thus that a black hole’s surface gravity is a temperature and a black hole’s horizon surface
area is an entropy of the same kind as that exhibited by any terrestrial thermodynamic
system (see for instance (Wallace, 2017, §1 et passim) for an account on the reception of
1Wu¨thrich (Forthcoming) offers an analysis of Bekenstein’s argument and an assessment of the strength
of the analogy he argues for, arriving at a largely negative conclusion concerning Bekenstein’s original
case. Dougherty & Callender (Forthcoming) and Wallace (2017) undertake a more general evaluation of the
strength of the analogy, and reach opposing conclusions.
2
black hole thermodynamics).2 In fact, it is the identification of a black hole as truly ther-
modynamic that permits the generalisation of the statement that entropy never decreases
for a closed system (the second law of thermodynamics) to the statement that the sum of
the ordinary entropy and the black hole entropy never decreases for a closed system (now
known as the generalised second law).
Although physicists are confident of the association between horizon area and entropy,
and thus between black holes and thermodynamics, it stands and falls with the actual exis-
tence of Hawking radiation in black holes—currently, like the rest of black hole thermody-
namics, only a theoretical hypothesis. Thus, an empirical confirmation of Hawking radiation
would strongly support the belief that the analogy actually holds in the physical world, and
so constitute an important stepping stone to an empirical access to quantum gravity. Al-
though astrophysical black holes (i.e., black holes which are not ‘small’) are being routinely
(indirectly) detected today, their potential Hawking radiation is far too weak to be detectable
against the fluctuations of the cosmic microwave background. Furthermore, black holes are
evidently not the kind of systems one can easily manipulate in ordinary laboratory practice—
they are systematically inaccessible to our standard experimental treatment.3 In an attempt
to overcome these difficulties, Unruh (1981) proposed the study of ‘analogue’ systems—such
as ‘dumb holes’, where sound waves in fluids encounter a horizon—and argued that from
these studies, we can learn something about black holes. In what turned out to be the birth
of what is now the thriving field of ‘analogue gravity’, Unruh relied on the basic idea of
analogical reasoning : if two systems are known to be similar in some relevant respects, then
we are justified in thinking that they are also similar in some unknown respects of interest.
Concretely, the argument trades on the idea that if black holes and analogue systems in the
lab are formally described by models that are relevantly the same, then either both or neither
should exhibit Hawking radiation. Recently, Steinhauer (2016) has reported the detection
of (spontaneous) Hawking radiation in experiments where Bose-Einstein condensates served
as analogue systems.4
Thus, the crucial question arises as to what extent analogue experiments such as those
proposed by Unruh and conducted by Steinhauer can shed light on black holes. To date,
philosophical examination of analogue experiments has mainly focused on the question of
whether or not they are capable of providing confirmation—that is, whether analogue ex-
periments can give us reason to believe in (or, quantitatively, increase our credence in)
particular hypotheses about the systems they are supposed to represent. This paper offers
an analysis of precisely this issue, reaching a conclusion opposed to the affirmative one argued
for in the philosophical literature by Dardashti, The´bault, and Winsberg (DTW, Dardashti
2Note, however, that physicists are premature in accepting the hypothetical temperature of Hawking
radiation as being an actual temperature—and thereby in promoting the analogy between thermodynamics
and black holes to an identity.
3We will use the term ‘inaccessible’ in a non-technical sense throughout, hoping that, whatever its precise
characterisation, it should be clear that astrophysical black holes are experimentally inaccessible.
4This is not the only work on this: for example, Rousseaux et al. (2008), Rousseaux et al. (2010), Wein-
furtner et al. (2013) and Euve´ et al. (2016) (among others) had indeed already found the analogue Hawking
effect in fluid systems (using water tanks). These analogue systems can however only mimic stimulated Hawk-
ing radiation (sometimes referred to as the ‘classical Hawking effect’) as opposed to spontaneous Hawking
radiation (as in Steinhauer’s experiment). As gravitational Hawking radiation can only be spontaneous,
Steinhauer’s finding allows for the stronger analogy.
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et al. (2017)), who articulate specific conditions under which analogue experiments could be
confirmatory, reaffirmed by The´bault (Forthcoming), and again by Dardashti, Hartmann,
The´bault, and Winsberg (DHTW, Dardashti et al. (2018)) using a Bayesian analysis to
quantify the potential degree of confirmation that analogue experiments could provide. A
secondary topic of discussion in the literature has been whether or not analogue experi-
ments differ from more familiar (and less concretely manipulable) cases of analogue rea-
soning. DTW (2017) and The´bault (Forthcoming) each argue that analogue experiment is
distinct from analogy, and that unlike mere analogies—which are standardly taken to lack
any confirmatory power, analogue experiments can (under specific circumstances) provide
confirmation.
Our main thesis is that analogue experiments do not yield either confirmation or dis-
confirmation of hypotheses concerning black holes, such as that they radiate as predicted
by Hawking. In support of this thesis, we argue that DTW’s (2017) arguments for show-
ing the potential of analogue experiments to provide confirmation of the existence of some
phenomenon in an inaccessible target system beg the question, and thus do not establish
their intended conclusion.5 In particular, these arguments applied to the case of dumb holes
do not show that such experiments can confirm the existence of Hawking radiation in black
holes. Concretely, the alleged confirmation of Hawking radiation crucially rests on the as-
sumptions that quantum field theory (QFT) in curved spacetime is applicable to the case at
hand, and that, specifically, the high-energy physics is independent of the trans-Planckian
physics—assumptions which should be confirmed, rather than be presupposed, by a discov-
ery of Hawking radiation. We thus claim that analogue models of Hawking radiation are
no more or less confirmatory than the analogy between thermodynamics and black hole
thermodynamics, for example.
In this paper, we are interested only in analogue experiments whose target systems (i.e.,
the systems they are supposed to represent) are inaccessible. This accords with the discussion
of analogue experiments so far in the philosophical literature, where they are primarily of
interest for their potential to penetrate the frontier of physics. As we argue in §2, we take
this inaccessibility to be the defining feature of analogue experiments. And, our major claim
in this paper (as a whole) is that analogue experiments cannot tell us whether or not a
particular phenomenon in the inaccessible target system exists.
The plan of the paper is as follows. After introducing some basics of analogical reasoning,
§2 asks what is special about analogue experiments, by comparing them with conventional
experiments and simulation (§2.1). Our primary examples of analogue experiments involve,
of course, dumb holes. These are presented in §3, including a description of the derivation of
Hawking radiation, a recap of the analogous derivation of the analogue hydrodynamic phe-
nomenon, and a depiction of the recent experimental results on this matter, as for instance
obtained by Steinhauer (2016) in Bose-Einstein condensates. In §4, we consider the con-
ditions under which analogue experiments may be confirmatory, according to DTW (2017)
and The´bault (Forthcoming). In §5, we show how DTW’s argument for how analogue ex-
periments may confirm the existence of a phenomenon in a target system already builds in
5Since the confirmation these authors are seeking is of course inductive rather than deductive, we do not
accuse them of committing the fallacy of deductive reasoning known under the same name. However, we do
accuse them of an inductive analogue of that fallacy and thus use the same expression.
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the assumption that the target system displays the phenomenon in question. Conclusions
follow in §6.
2 What is an analogue experiment?
We take the prime examples of analogue experiments in physics to be dumb holes : laboratory
experiments in fluid set-ups that are analogues of black holes. A simple example is the
demonstration of an analogue black hole horizon using water draining from a bathtub and
a speaker below the drain hole, transmitting sound waves up through the draining water.
If the speed of the water as it drains out exceeds the speed of sound waves travelling in
the opposite direction in the water, then no sound can escape from this point: one obtains
an ‘acoustic horizon’. These systems are thus known as ‘dumb holes’—as in mute, unable
to speak. The target system is a black hole, which possesses a horizon delimiting a region
of spacetime from which no light can escape, due to extreme curvature of spacetime. The
water in the source system, S, is thus supposed to be analogous to spacetime in the target
system, T . The salient properties of the source system are the speed of sound and the speed
of the water, which are analogous to the speed of light, and the curvature of spacetime (i.e.,
gravity), respectively, in the target system. Other hypothesised black hole phenomena can
be explored using similar analogue systems, including superradiance in rotating black holes
(Torres et al., 2017), and Hawking radiation (Steinhauer, 2016), the latter which we consider
in more detail below (§3).
An analogue experiment is so-called because it relies on analogical reasoning.6 Following
Bartha (2016), an argument by analogy has the following form:
P1. S is similar to T in certain (known) respects.
P2. S has some further feature Q.
C. Therefore, T also has the feature Q, or some feature Q∗ similar to Q.
Here, S is the source system, and T is the target system, i.e., the system of interest. The
argument form is inductive rather than deductive, meaning that the conclusion is not guar-
anteed to follow from the premises. The consensus in the philosophical literature (see Bartha
(2016) for a review) is that analogue reasoning—though certainly useful and ubiquitous in
science—only establishes the plausibility of a hypothesis. That is, analogies may confer some
heuristic support for a hypothesis, providing reason for scientists to investigate it further.7
According to this consensus, analogies are primarily of heuristic value: motivating additional
research (e.g., experiments), rather than confirming hypotheses about T .
An analogy between S and T involves a mapping between parts of S and those of T .
Not all of the parts of S and T need to be placed in correspondence, however; usually, an
analogy only relates some of the entities of the two systems, identifying the most significant
similarities between S and T . DTW (2017) point to a particular case of analogy, identified
6We take ‘analogue’ to be synonymous with ‘analogical’.
7See Bartha (2016, §2.3), Bartha (2010, §8.5), and, for a rather positive account on the linkage between
confirmation and analogical argument, Hesse (1964).
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by Hempel (1965), where there is a syntactic isomorphism between the laws describing S and
those describing T . Bartha (2010, 208f) says of this that the “essential idea is that the two
sets of physical laws have a common mathematical form and may be obtained by assigning
different physical interpretations to the symbols that appear in that common form”. DTW
(2017) adopt this idea of analogy as syntactic isomorphism, but generalise it so that it may
apply more broadly—for instance, to cases where it is not the laws of S and T that are
isomorphic, but the particular modelling frameworks used to describe each of the systems,
where these modelling frameworks have narrower scope than laws or theories do.
DTW then define an analogue simulation in the following way (though, as we explain
below, we think the term ‘analogue experiment ’ would be more appropriate):
DTW’s characterisation of an analogue simulation
“[A] system S provides an analogue simulation of system T when the following
set of conditions obtain [footnote suppressed]:
Step 1: For certain purposes and to a certain degree of desired accuracy, modelling
framework MS is adequate for modelling system S within a certain domain
of conditions DS.
Step 2: For certain purposes and to a certain degree of desired accuracy, modelling
framework MT is adequate for modelling system T within a certain domain
of conditions DT .
Step 3: There exists exploitable mathematical similarities between the structure of
MS and MT sufficient to define a syntactic isomorphism robust within the
domains DS and DT .
Step 4: We are interested in knowing something about the behaviour of a system
T within the domain of conditions DT , and to a degree of accuracy and for
a purpose consistent with those specified in Step 2. For whatever reasons,
however, we are unable to directly observe the behaviour of a system T in
those conditions to the degree of accuracy we require.
Step 5: We are, on the other hand, able to study a system S after having put it
under such conditions as will enable us to conclude a statement of the form:
ClaimS: Under conditions DS and to degree of accuracy that will be needed below,
we can for the purpose of employing the reasoning below assert that a system
S will exhibit phenomena PS.
The formal similarities mentioned in Step 3 then allow us to reason from ClaimS
to ClaimT, which is of the form:
ClaimT: Under conditions DT , a system T will exhibit phenomena PT .”
(DTW 2017, 67).
This characterisation of an analogue experiment is also DTW’s argument for how ana-
logue experiments can be confirmatory—we return to the issue of confirmation in §4–5. For
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now, however, we focus on understanding how analogue experiments differ from conven-
tional experiments. Here (§2.1), we argue that the crucial difference is the inaccessibility
of T , which prevents scientists from determining whether or not T actually exemplifies the
same type of behaviour as S under the analogous conditions.
2.1 Comparison with conventional experiments and simulations
We take it that (conventional) experiments in science can be confirmatory; while the con-
firmatory status of analogue experiments is less clear (otherwise papers such as DTW and
DHTW would not be written). Thus, in this subsection we attempt to distil the key dif-
ferences between analogue and conventional experiments. We find that the key difference
lies in the inaccessibility of the target system in an analogue experiment. This finding is
consistent with DTW’s characterisation as laid out above, as well as the use of the term by
the other authors.
Two forms of experimental validity are standardly distinguished: an experiment is inter-
nally valid if it reveals something about the particular system being used in the experiment,
and an experiment is externally valid if it is probative of the more general class of systems
that the experimenters are interested in. If an experiment is conducted in order to learn only
about the particular system being used, then the source and target systems are the same.
We are not concerned with these kinds of experiments here, but instead with experiments
where the source and target systems are different.
In all cases of experiment in physics (apart from those being done in order to gain only
internally valid results) the particular systems being used are meant to be representative of
some more general class of systems which are supposed or conjectured, by current physics, to
have in common some particular salient properties. Whether the experiment is being done
in order to develop a hypothesis (model, modelling framework, or theory), or whether it is
conducted in order to test some hypothesis, the salient properties of the system are those
that feature in the developed, or tested, hypothesis.
A first attempt to distinguish analogue from non-analogue experiments is then to say that,
in non-analogue experiments, T is supposed to be—or is a potential candidate for being—of
the same kind of system as S according to current physics ; i.e., best current physics leads
us to believe that the salient properties are strongly of the same kind in both systems. By
contrast, one might imagine that, in analogue experiments, S and T are not supposed to be
the same kind of systems, but merely analogous to one another, with S exemplifying salient
properties that are supposed to be only formally similar to those of T , according to their
respective modelling frameworks.8 But—significantly—this first attempt at a definition will
not do, because what it is to be ‘the same kind of system’ in physics, for a specific application,
is in fact determined by reference to the formal similarity of the modelling frameworks that
describe the systems under the relevant conditions—any additional commonalities between
S and T that are irrelevant to the phenomena of interest, are, by definition, not salient.
8This distinction is akin to one that has frequently been proposed to distinguish experiments from
simulations, which holds that, in experiments, S and T bear material similarities, while in simulations, S
and T bear only formal similarities. We agree with Winsberg (2009, 2010) that a distinction along these lines
is not tenable, whether between simulations and experiments, or analogue- and non-analogue experiments.
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We mention a few examples to illustrate this. Firstly, consider an experiment on vortices
in fluids: it may be performed on a single fluid, but is supposed to generalise to all fluids.
What counts as ‘the same kind of system’ in this case may just be any system that is
described by the Navier-Stokes equation under the relevant conditions. The ‘same kind of
system’ may include air, water, smoke, liquid helium or something as exotic as a Bose-
Einstein condensate—whatever system whose behaviour is supposed to be, according to
current physics, described by the same modelling framework under the relevant conditions.
Another example is that of phase transitions: here, the same kind of systems are those that
share a critical exponent in the renormalisation group equations that describe their scaling
behaviour. These systems may be incredibly diverse in constitution—metals, fluids, or even
the universe itself (e.g., in cosmological domain wall formation)—yet, from the perspective of
the phenomena of interest, they are of the same kind. In this case, the phenomenon is said to
be universal, and the systems that exemplify it are said to be in the same universality class.9
Although these are technical terms typically used to refer to this sort of scaling behaviour in
statistical mechanics, and related ideas in QFT, we henceforth co-opt them, and take them
to refer more broadly to any systems that exemplify the same behaviour under some relevant
conditions ; our doing so is in accordance with DTW’s use of the term ‘universality’.
A final example is an experiment demonstrating resonance in a pendulum. In this case,
a mass on a string can be treated as the same kind of system as an LC circuit—both exem-
plify the relevant behaviour and are, according to current physics, described by modelling
frameworks that are syntactically isomorphic. On this view, two systems that are described
by syntactically isomorphic modelling frameworks can be seen as the same kind of system
at some higher level of abstraction, i.e., by appeal to more general features that the systems
have in common, as captured by the the formal (structural) similarities of their descriptions.
In the LC circuit and pendulum case, for instance, the class is that of simple harmonic
oscillators, while in the fluid case, it is that of (a specific kind of) fluid dynamics, etc. In-
deed, this move to a higher level of generality where physics can identify two compositionally
distinct systems as being of the same kind is what is sought, by DTW, in arguing for the
confirmatory nature of the dumb hole case. As discussed below (§4), DTW’s argument for
the confirmatory nature of analogue experiments relies on the experimental demonstration
of the robustness, or universality, of the behaviour of interest in several systems of differing
constitutions.
Now, all experiments (except those where internal validity is the only concern) rely on
extrapolation in generalising their results to their target systems.10 External validity is
argued for in various ways, including via analogue reasoning. We thus suggest that the key
difference between analogue and non-analogue experiments is not the exploitation of the
syntactic isomorphism in Step 3 of DTW’s characterisation.11
But then, given the fact that the dumb hole experiments—our exemplar of analogue
experiments—aim to establish that, on some level of abstraction, black holes and dumb
9Cf. Batterman (2000).
10Admittedly, this has apparently been explored more in the context of biology, e.g., Baetu (2016); Weber
(2018, §3), and in the literature on simulation, e.g., Winsberg (2010).
11Note that DTW do not themselves suggest that the syntactic isomorphism is the defining feature
of analogue experiments, nor that its use is sufficient for distinguishing an analogue experiment from a
conventional one.
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holes are in the same universality class12, what can we say distinguishes an analogue exper-
iment from other sorts of experiment in physics? We propose that the answer lies in the
inaccessibility of the target system. Scientists cannot access T , and so they cannot confirm
if T and S actually are in the same universality class.
Although black holes are conjectured, by current physics, to be described by a particular
modelling framework (QFT in curved spacetime, §3)—it is not known if they are actually
described by this framework, because we cannot access a black hole under the appropriate
conditions. Thus, even though this framework is syntactically isomorphic to that of the
dumb hole, we cannot establish that dumb holes and black holes really are the same kind
of system. By contrast, physicists have access to pendulums and so can confirm that they
are examples of simple harmonic oscillators under the relevant conditions, and thus can
confirm that they are in the same universality class as the LC circuit under the appropriate
conditions to demonstrate resonance. Hence, we suggest that the use of the term ‘analogue’
to differentiate the dumb hole case from other examples of experiment in physics is an act of
dignified restraint—it signifies recognition of our comparatively (severely) limited epistemic
position with respect to the target system, compared with other cases of experiment.
Owing to this exceptionally limited epistemic position, together with the essential use
of analogue reasoning that forms part of the definition of analogue experiment (as in, e.g.,
DTW’s characterisation), analogue experiments retain the same status as other instances
of analogue reasoning in science.13 Thus, the simple ability to perform experiments on one
side of the analogy does not mean that the formal underpinnings of the analogy become any
stronger. As concrete and manipulable as the accessible side of the analogy may be, it is
the inferential step to the other side of the analogy which remains an instance of analogical
reasoning.
We close this section with the distinctions we propose, and which we use in the rest of
the paper. In an...
Experiment, S and T are—according to current physics—supposed to be, or are can-
didates for potentially being, the same kind of system for the purpose of interest (i.e., as
relevant to the phenomena under investigation); in other words, T is supposed to be, or is
conjectured to potentially be, in the same universality class as S (on our broad interpre-
tation of this term, as referring to systems described by syntactically isomorphic modelling
frameworks) under the relevant conditions. (Note that S and T may be considered, by cur-
rent physics, to be different systems at different levels of description, and/or under different
conditions, e.g., they may have different microphysics that distinguishes them. The point is
that these differences are irrelevant for the particular behaviour under investigation in the
experiment, and so does not explicitly appear in the modelling frameworks describing the
two systems).
12This is of course not the only aim or benefit of these experiments! But, as we argue in §4, according to
DTW, if dumb holes are to be confirmatory of black hole phenomena, it is precisely this universality that
must be established.
13We of course acknowledge the difference between an argument and an experiment, but our point is that
analogical arguments are still analogical arguments even when they relate to concrete, manipulable systems
in the world.
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Analogue experiment, again, S and T are—according to current physics—supposed to
be, or are candidates for potentially being, the same kind of system (i.e., in the same univer-
sality class, as defined by the relevant modelling framework) for the purpose of interest (this
is because analogue experiments are a subclass of experiment). However, T is inaccessible
under the relevant conditions for confirming that it is actually the same kind of system as S
for the purpose of interest.14
Simulation, S is not supposed—according to current physics—to be the same kind of
system as T for the purpose of interest (but to provide results that can potentially be
translated into knowledge about T ).
The idea is that what counts as the ‘same kind of system’ is to some extent context and
interest dependent. In this case, we are appealing to the interests of the researchers involved,
and their employment of the best current physical theories (plus standard interpretations).
When physicists refer to something as a ‘simulation’ rather than an experiment, we take it
that this signifies that S is not supposed to be (for the purposes of interest) the same ‘kind’
of system as T , and thus is not thought to be described by the modelling framework that
defines the relevant universality class. Instead, perhaps, the system just produces output
consistent with the modelling framework; it may, for instance, be thought to implement the
modelling framework artificially, e.g., in a virtual environment (acknowledging of course that
experiments and analogue experiments typically require a considerable amount of ‘setting
up’, and thus some degree of ‘artificiality’). Note that we include a definition of simulation
only to make the contrast between simulation and experiment; we do not discuss simulation
in this paper.15
Thus, on our adopted distinctions, the dumb hole case is an example of an analogue
experiment, rather than a simulation, contra the terminology used by DTW, which classifies
it as ‘analogue simulation’. Another consequence of these definitions is that it is (in principle)
possible that current analogue experiments are, in the future, recognised as conventional
experiments. If scientists were to have sufficient access to black holes to confirm the relevant
aspects of the modelling framework used to describe them—e.g., if direct detection methods
for Hawking radiation were one day able to be developed, and these confirmed the existence
of the phenomenon in black holes—then dumb holes could be used to experimentally probe
14In a nutshell, this is also the reason why we will come to the conclusion in the following sections that
dumb holes and other currently available analogue experiments on Hawking radiation simply cannot confirm
the existence of gravitational Hawking radiation.
15Winsberg (2009, 2010) for instance characterises the distinction between simulation and experiment
epistemically; for a simulation or experiment to be externally valid, S (in either case) is hoped to “stand
in” for T , by sharing formal descriptions, and in both cases this hope is justified by various background
knowledge and assumptions of the researchers. In the case of experiment, this background is, for instance,
the belief that S and T are the same kind of system, perhaps being materially similar. By contrast, in
the case of simulation, the background is based on certain features of model building practices (background
knowledge about model building practices is also used in the case of experiment, but according to Winsberg,
the difference here is that in experiment this is mainly used to establish internal validity, while in the case
of simulation it concerns external validity). Thus, on Winsberg’s account of simulation, it is possible that S
and T are supposed to be the same kind of system, but this supposition is not what is used to justify the
belief in the external validity of the simulation.
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black holes (given that the two would be recognised, on some higher level of abstraction, as
‘the same kind of system’), and such experiments could be confirmatory.
3 Hawking radiation and dumb holes
This section lays bare the assumptions from which Hawking radiation is derived: the deriva-
tion relies on the framework of QFT in curved spacetime, and on a resolution of the so-called
‘trans-Planckian problem’, which arises from the assumptions about trans-Planckian physics
that that have to be fed into the theory. As Hawking radiation cannot be detected by
conventional means, we briefly discuss analogous hydrodynamic Hawking effects.16
3.1 Hawking radiation
In the mid-1970s, Hawking discovered that the QFT vacuum state becomes a state with
(real) particles present if there is a black hole, i.e., that black holes radiate (Hawking,
1975). More precisely, he considered the vacuum state of a scalar field in the presence of
an event horizon (that of the black hole) and found that it evolves into a thermal state of
temperature T . Because the effect occurs due to the presence of a horizon, the temperature
is associated with the black hole.17 It results in energy being radiated away, leading to the
eventual ‘evaporation’ of the black hole. The original calculation of the effect proceeds in
the framework of QFT in curved spacetime.18
A non-technical heuristic explanation attributes the effect to vacuum fluctuations leading
to the separation of positive and negative modes through the black hole’s event horizon: if
such a pair forms near the event horizon, only one of the two partners may fall into the
black hole, separating the pair and thus precluding their otherwise typical recombination,
leaving the outward region with an effective excess energy. The escape of the excess parti-
cles to the asymptotic region is then what gives rise to outward radiation. Although this
heuristic picture is quite imprecise—it does for instance not allow for any distinction be-
tween the Hawking effect and the Unruh effect (cf. Barbado et al. (2016))—it is sufficient
for understanding the Hawking effect for what follows.
The Hawking radiation of typical astrophysical black holes has an extremely weak em-
pirical signature, making its detection a near impossibility. As a black hole’s temperature
T is proportional to its surface gravity κ—and, thereby, inversely proportional to its mass
M—the temperature of the radiation becomes smaller the bigger the black hole considered.
Consequently, black holes detectable in astronomical settings would emit radiation of an or-
der several million times smaller than the temperature of the cosmic microwave background
(The´bault, Forthcoming, 4). Additionally, black holes of a size sufficiently small that their
putative radiation could perhaps be distinguished from noise have not yet been discovered
16Cf. also DTW (2017) and The´bault (Forthcoming).
17Hawking radiation has been derived for other kind of fields, including the electrodynamical vector field,
although not necessarily using an analogous derivation. In fact, there seem to be at least five (putatively)
independent derivations of the Hawking effect in the literature (cf. Wallace (2017)).
18It does not require a framework of semi-classical gravity in the sense of accounting for the backreaction
of quantum matter to spacetime.
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(perhaps unsurprisingly, given that the smaller the black hole, the more rapidly it would
supposedly evaporate away). But, as lab experiments on tailored artificial micro black holes
seem impossible at the moment, the only options are to look out for small black holes ei-
ther in particle detection facilities (see e.g., Giddings & Thomas (2002) or Dimopoulos &
Landsberg (2001) for proposals in this direction), or in the history of our universe. The
Fermi-Gamma Ray Space Telescope (in a low-Earth orbit since 2008) has been searching,
among other things, for radiative remnants of relatively small black hole objects from the
beginning of the universe (see for instance, Ukwatta et al. (2010)).
As stated, Hawking radiation is derived in the framework of QFT in curved spacetime;
this is a non-trivial combination of GR and QFT which neglects the backreaction of matter
on the curved spacetime. Such negligence is generally justifiable if the relevant length scales
are large and curvature effects small. The detection of gravitational Hawking radiation would
constitute a crucial confirmation of the applicability of the framework. So far, any available
confirmation of QFT in curved spacetime is highly indirect in the sense that it does not even
stem from very indirect measurements concerning predictions of particular QFTs in curved
spacetime, but rather from claims that particular QFTs in curved spacetime obtain the right
behaviour in various limits19: for instance, the geometric optics limit of electrodynamics
in curved spacetime, which is a limit of quantum electrodynamics in curved spacetime,
describes light rays as tracing out null geodesics given sufficiently high frequency relative to
the curvature scale. That light indeed moves on null geodesics in curved spacetime has been
observationally verified, e.g. in gravitational lensing effects (see Dyson et al. (1920)).
This evidence is not only indirect, but also highly unspecific about QFT in curved space-
time as it does not concern specific predictions of QFT in curved spacetime. In fact, it is
currently only tenuously understood how well the theory applies empirically, i.e., whether
its techniques of combining GR and QFT are in any sense valid. At the moment, there only
seem to be two major applications and tests for QFT in curved spacetime that do concern
specific predictions:
1. The prediction of gravitational Hawking radiation.
2. The prediction of a specific primordial density perturbation spectrum (associated with
cosmic inflation scenarios20).
The status of Hawking radiation is, of course, open, whereas the specific primordial
density spectrum has indeed been reported as successfully measured.21 These tests can only
be used to assess the conjunction of QFT in curved spacetime and certain other theories
(mainly inflationary theories). This must strike one as problematic given that the empirical,
conceptual or (even) the methodological status of (models of) inflation is disputed:
• At the conceptual level, it is not clear that the issues that inflation addresses (horizon
problem, flatness problems, fine-tuning) are problems in need of a solution, and even
19In other words, the exact same limit behaviour might be reproducible by myriad theories other than
QFTs in curved spacetime.
20For an introduction to the topic of inflation, including the derivation of primordial density fluctuations,
see e.g., Baumann (2011). For experimental results on the spectrum see Crotty et al. (2003).
21See for instance Lanusse et al. (2014).
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if they are, it may be that inflation just exchanges previous problems of fine-tuning by
new ones (see McCoy (2015)).
• At the empirical level, it seems as if the current predictions do include an accurate ac-
count of observed primordial density fluctuations—but again this does not mean that
inflation is the only game in town. At best, the observation of the specific spectrum of
fluctuations would only provide straightforward support to the QFT in curved space-
time framework provided that (some form of) inflation holds. Two alternative models
to inflation (matter bounce and string gas cosmology) arguably do equally well as in-
flationary models in predicting the mentioned fluctuations (see Brandenberger (2014)
for a discussion accessible to philosophers). Only provided that these models (also) use
QFT in curved spacetime for deriving predictions of the density spectrum, the fluctua-
tions observed could in principle also confirm QFT in virtue of one of these models (and
not inflation) holding. And as a matter of fact, string gas cosmology, however, provides
the same (currently measurable) predictions as inflation without any reference to QFT
in curved spacetime. Instead this approach applies thermodynamic considerations of
a gas made of strings (not particles).22
• At the methodological level, inflation models are accused of not even being falsifiable:
there are so many models that surely some will give somewhat accurate predictions;
worse, single inflation models in current inflationary theory typically involve multi-
verses so that within these multiverses surely one subsystem has the required properties
to explain any desirable phenomena found in the cosmic microwave background—or so
the common objection goes (see Ijjas et al. (2017)).
Thus, in light of inflation’s controversial status, a more direct and less theory-dependent
test of QFT in curved spacetime is needed. Unfortunately, such a test does not appear to
be available among conventional experiments.
3.2 Analogue Hawking radiation
New hope of confirming the existence of Hawking radiation has emerged from analogue re-
alisations of the gravitational Hawking effect through hydrodynamic structures (including
Bose-Einstein condensates, BECs)23. In short, such hydrodynamic systems exhibit an effec-
tive background metric that is structurally identical to that of a spacetime with an event
22Consider for instance Brandenberger (2014) (p. 118) on this:
However, the physics of the generation mechanism is very different. In the case of inflationary
cosmology, fluctuations are assumed to start as quantum vacuum perturbations because classical
inhomogeneities are red-shifting. In contrast, in the Hagedorn phase of string gas cosmology
there is no red-shifting of classical matter. Hence, it is the fluctuations in the classical matter
which dominate. Since classical matter is a string gas, the dominant fluctuations are string
thermodynamic fluctuations.
23Bose-Einstein condensates can be treated at the level of a hydrodynamic approximation, see Garay
et al. (2000).
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horizon. Then, once quantum fields enter on top, these systems exemplify an effect analogous
to Hawking radiation.
To illustrate how the analogous Hawking effect is derived, consider a dumb hole, i.e.,
a hydrodynamic system with a local fluid stream running faster than the local speed of
sound, with appropriate fluid density and velocity such that the acoustic horizon can be
modelled by a Schwarzschild-like metric (in which acoustic waves play the same role as the
matter fields do in Hawking’s original derivation of the gravitational Hawking effect). Recall
that24 a classical fluid in the framework of continuum hydrodynamics is characterised by
the mass density ρ, pressure p, and velocity ~v of the fluid volume element at each point of
space. Only considering fluctuations around a fixed background configuration of the fluid,
i.e. (~v, p, ρ) = (~v0, p0, ρ0) + (~v1, p1, ψ1), one can linearise the fluid’s continuity equation to
arrive at
1√−g
∂
∂xµ
(
√−ggµν ∂
∂xν
ψ1) = 0,
through which the (density) fluctuations ψ1 can be read as waves propagating in an effective
background-spacetime structure gacousticµν determined by the fixed fluid background configu-
ration (~v0, p0, ρ0). The background spacetime structure takes the form
gacousticµν =
ρ0
csound
−(c2sound − v20)
... −(v0)j
. . . . . . .
−(v0)i ... δij
 ,
where c2sound denotes the speed of sound. Upon suitable choice of fluid density, velocity
profile and fluid medium (sound speed), this acoustic metric can be put into a one-to-one
relationship with a Schwarzschild-metric:
gSchwarzschildµν =
−(c
2
0 − 2GMr )
... −
√
2GM
r
~rj
. . . . . . .
−
√
2GM
r
~ri
... δij

for a given Schwarzschild mass M and Newton constant G. Consequently, the wave equation
for the fluctuation in the velocity potential in a suitably chosen fluid can be understood as
analogous to a wave equation for a scalar field in a Schwarzschild spacetime. The field linked
to these fluctuations can equally be quantised like the scalar field in a Schwarzschild space-
time. While the gravitational Hawking effect leads to radiation in the form of photons, the
analogue hydrodynamical Hawking effects brings about the occurrence of phonons (‘sound
particles’).
Steinhauer (2016) claims to have experimentally verified the analogue (spontaneous)
Hawking effect in a BEC. In Steinhauer’s experiments, Hawking radiation is not directly
measured; instead, Hawking radiation is linked to the entanglement of two particle partners
coming out of vacuum fluctuations (consider the heuristic explanation above), and it is this
entanglement which is measured (not the radiation itself). This becomes possible in the
24We are following The´bault (Forthcoming) here.
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analogue scenario, as—unlike for a black hole—the measurement of correlations between
entangled partners is straightforwardly possible as both sides of the horizon can be accessed
by the observer in the lab.
4 DTW’s argument that analogue experiments can be
confirmatory
According to The´bault (Forthcoming), an analogue experiment is capable of providing confir-
mation when we have reasons to believe in the external validity of the analogue experiment.
Similarly, DTW argue that we can obtain ‘analogue confirmation’ when we have (what they
term) “MEEGA”, or model-external, empirically-grounded arguments, for the robustness of
the modelling frameworks of both the analogue experiment and its target system.
In the case of dumb holes as analogue experiments for Hawking radiation, The´bault’s
arguments for the external validity of the dumb hole experiments, as well as DTW’s MEEGA
for the robustness of the two modelling frameworks are the same: it is the autonomy of
the phenomena compared to microphysics—i.e., multiple realisability, or universality. The
universality of the Hawking effect in dumb holes has a theoretical as well as an experimental
component. The theoretical universality is taken to be demonstrated by calculations such as
those in Unruh & Schu¨tzhold (2005).25 In the actual black hole case, these are supposed to
establish that—under certain assumptions on trans-Planckian physics (which we will list and
discuss below)—the Hawking effect does not depend, to lowest order, on the details of the
unknown theory of quantum gravity. In the dumb hole case, these arguments are supposed
to establish that the existence of the analogue Hawking effect does not depend on the theory
of the fluid at high energies where the assumption of continuity breaks down (i.e., the theory
describing the fluid’s constituents). The empirical aspect of DTW’s MEEGA is supposed to
come about once (or if) there are several experiments demonstrating the analogue effect in
different sorts of systems. In such a case, then, according to DTW, we will have empirical
confirmation of the existence of Hawking radiation in astrophysical black holes.
The MEEGA, according to DTW (pp. 71, 73), are supposed to strengthen the analogy
by virtue of the syntactic isomorphism between the modelling frameworks of the source
and target systems, by providing a reason to believe in a relationship between the implicit
assumptions used in the derivations of the phenomena in both of the frameworks. In the case
where the MEEGA essentially turns on universality considerations, this means establishing
that any differences between the source and target systems at high energy scales (which
may or may not be captured by the analogy between these systems) are irrelevant for the
appearance of the phenomena in question. Thus, the idea is that we can take an analogue
experiment as capable of confirming claims about its target system when we have MEEGA
establishing why any differences between the two systems do not affect the appearance of
the behaviour of interest. And these universality arguments are not just theoretical, but
have been experimentally confirmed through the appearance of the analogue phenomenon
in various different source systems that are each supposedly analogous to the target system.
25These calculations are further discussed in DTW and The´bault regarding the trans-Planckian problem,
but this is not important for our arguments.
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In other words, using the language above (§2), confirmation comes once we have amassed a
collection of experimentally accessible systems within the same ‘universality class’ that T is
supposed to be within.
Referring to DTW’s argument structure quoted above (§2, p. 6), the MEEGA are sup-
posed to bolster Step 3, i.e., the analogy (syntactic isomorphism). It is this special MEEGA
boost that is meant to elevate the analogy such that experimental observation of the ana-
logue phenomena in the lab system can count as confirmation of the existence (under the
relevant conditions) of the actual phenomena in the target system.
On our view, confirmation of Hawking radiation via analogue simulation can
only be established given the acceptance of a chain of reasoning involving uni-
versality arguments in combination with diverse realizations of the counterpart
effect. These diverse realizations will thus simultaneously provide the empirical
support for the MEEGA supporting the simulation, and realize the simulations
themselves. (DTW, 2017, 76)
Given the set-up above, two readings of an argument on analogue confirmation now
suggest themselves:
On the first reading, the argument is basically as follows (subject to all the conditions
cited in their Steps 1–5, §2, p. 6, above): assuming that the target system is described by
MT (and MT is syntactically isomorphic to MS, etc.), and the experiment on S confirms
that the microphysics of S is irrelevant for the appearance of the phenomenon PS, then,
by analogy, we have confirmatory evidence that the microphysics of T is also irrelevant
to the appearance of PT . The experiment, in this case, is about demonstrating that the
(precise form of) microphysics of various systems described by MS (i.e., the various systems
experimented on) is irrelevant to the appearance of the phenomenon of interest in those
systems. The problem with the argument on this interpretation is that it cannot be used to
confirm that an unknown system actually displays the phenomenon of interest, but just that,
if it did display this phenomenon, its microphysics could be neglected in our description of
this ‘macro’ behaviour.
In order to actually have confirmation of the existence of PT by observation of PS (again,
under all the conditions in Steps 1–5 of DTW’s argument), we would need to confirm that
T is the same kind of system as S for the purposes at hand—i.e., that they are described
by syntactically isomorphic modelling frameworks under the relevant conditions. This is the
second way of reading the argument of DTW, and the one most strongly suggested by their
text26: the empirically established universality arguments, i.e., the MEEGA, are supposed to
provide evidence that S and T are in the same ‘universality class’, and thus the appearance
of PS could give us evidence that PT would also occur under the appropriate conditions. It
is this interpretation of DTW’s argument that we have adopted here (see, e.g., §2.1).
On both readings, however, the problem we identify is the same—and it is independent
of the MEEGA and Step 3—it is the assumption of Step 2: that T is adequately described
by MT . Given that the target system is inaccessible in an analogue experiment, we cannot
26This reading is supported, e.g., by DTW’s use of the idea of ‘universality’, and statements like, “we
defend the claim that the phenomena of gravitational Hawking radiation could be confirmed in the case
its counterpart is detected within experiments conducted on diverse realizations of the analogue model.”
Dardashti et al. (2017, 55)
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Figure 1: The basic structure of the main argument of DTW (2017).
know if a particular modelling framework actually applies to it. Analogue experiments simply
cannot tell us this, as we will elaborate on in the next section.
5 Analogue confirmation begs the question
Let us review the structure of the main argument to the conclusion that analogue experiments
can be confirmatory and that, in particular, analogue models such as dumb holes can confirm
the existence of gravitational Hawking radiation in astrophysical black holes. This structure
is depicted in Figure 1. In this figure, the lab system is on the right side of the diagram,
while the target system—the black hole—is on the left. We have our lab system, i.e., the
analogue system, such as a Bose-Einstein condensate in the upper rectangular box. This
analogue system is represented by an analogue model, i.e., by a theoretical description of
the pertinent physics of the analogue system, and the experimental task is to detect possible
(analogue) Hawking radiation that is emitted by the system. The corresponding target
system, i.e., the black hole, is represented by the minimal semi-classical model used by
Hawking, i.e., QFT on curved spacetime. The question we are ultimately interested in is, of
course, whether there is (actual) Hawking radiation emitted from the target system, as was
predicted by Hawking.
According to this view, there now remain two main tasks to confirm gravitational Hawk-
ing radiation. First, there is the experimental work of setting up a suitable analogue system
and detecting Hawking radiation emitted from such a system. Because Hawking radiation
is weak, this task is far from trivial. As we have mentioned above, Steinhauer (2016) claims
to have successfully completed this first task for spontaneous analogue Hawking radiation.
Although these results have not been reproduced so far, let us accept this claim for the sake
of argument. After discharging this first task, there remains the second task: ascertaining
the external validity of the analogue experiment—i.e., to extend its validity to include the
target system, represented by the horizontal connections in Figure 1.
This second task divides into two subtasks, corresponding, essentially, to DTW’s Step 3
on the one hand and to Steps 1 and 2 on the other. These two subtasks are represented in
Figure 1 by the top two horizontal connections between the two sides and are marked ‘(i)’ and
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‘(ii)’, respectively. In order to establish the external validity of the analogue experiment,
both of these subtasks must be completed. The first subtask, (i), establishes the formal
analogy (the syntactic isomorphism) between the two modelling frameworks, i.e., between
the descriptions of the analogue system and the target system. Just as in the case of the
formal analogy between thermodynamic entropy and black hole entropy (or, more generally,
between thermodynamic laws and black hole laws), the formal analogy between the modelling
frameworks of Hawking radiation for the analogue and target systems must be supplemented
by an argument establishing its physical salience.27 Specifically, the syntactic isomorphism
between the models must be complemented with considerations establishing the physical
adequacy of the models in both cases.
If the physics of both systems is faithfully captured by formally analogous models, then
there is reason to believe that both systems are governed essentially by the same physics, at
least at the scale of interest (their microphysics will, in general, differ). The observation of
Hawking radiation in one system would then confirm that there is Hawking radiation also
in the other case. Hence, the second subtask, (ii), is of central importance to the success of
DTW’s argument. It is the task of Steps 1 and 2 to establish the physical adequacy of the
modelling frameworks for the analogue and the target systems, respectively. Although this
subtask consists in work proper to each side, evaluating different conditions for each—hence
the separate Steps in DTW’s argument—, and thus does not involve a direct link between
the two sides of the analogy, the successful completion of this work on both sides results in
a promotion of the formal analogy to one underwritten by physics (at the scale of interest).
It is establishing this horizontal connection (ii) which guarantees the physical salience of the
analogy and would, if borne out, justify the inferences from one physical system to the other.
The first part of (ii), DTW’s Step 1, consists in work necessary to validate the physical
adequacy of the analogue model. This side of the analogy is secured by a solid theoretical
framework constituted by a tower of theories known to describe the physics of these ana-
logue models at different levels of detail and universality. This tower includes, depending
on the particular analogue system at stake, molecular hydrodynamics or Bogoliubov Bose-
Einstein condensate theory—and, in any case, ultimately QFT. Not only are these analogue
systems thus under firm theoretical control, these theories have independently been tested
and confirmed on systems just like these analogue systems. Thus, the physical adequacy of
the modelling framework on this side of the analogy is solidly underwritten by theory and
experiment.
Given that Step 1 is thus unproblematic, the second part of (ii), Step 2 in DTW’s
argument, would ascertain, if successful, the physical adequacy of the semi-classical model
of black holes. This is what makes Step 2 the keystone of the argument above. Specifically
considering the case of Hawking radiation, DTW are assuming in Step 2 that black holes are
accurately described by the modelling framework from which Hawking radiation is derived.
In their own words:
The system of type T in this case is the astrophysical black hole. The modelling
framework MT is a semi-classical model for gravity in which we have: (i) a
fixed classical space-time that features the establishment of an event horizon via
27Something Bekenstein failed to do, as argued in Wu¨thrich (Forthcoming).
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gravitational collapse leading to a black hole; and (ii) a quantum scalar field
evaluated in the regions of past and future null infinity, which are assumed to
be Minkowskian. The domain of conditions, DT , is limited to the times after
the collapse phase of the black hole, the details of which are assumed to be
irrelevant. The work in dealing with the trans-Plankian problem discussed above
is sufficient to demonstrate the viability of the modelling framework for some
further refinement of DS. For example, the conditions (i)–(iii) proposed by Unruh
and Schu¨tzhold [...] (DTW, 2017, 83).
According to DTW, what would ultimately confirm gravitational Hawking radiation would
be the existence of substantive reasons for believing that black holes fall into the same uni-
versality class as other systems that exhibit the phenomenon. Two generally necessary con-
ditions for (re)producing Hawking radiation—and thus for establishing the external validity
of the analogue experiment to the more general class of systems it is meant to represent—are,
following Barcelo´ et al. (2011, §5.1.1), (a) that the form of the model is that of relativistic
quantum fields on a classical effective background spacetime, and (b) that there is a horizon
present in the geometry of the model. Furthermore, as DTW are aware (2017, 81) and
discuss at length, for the universality claim made in Unruh & Schu¨tzhold (2005) to extend
to black holes, the so-called ‘trans-Planckian problem’28 must be solved in order to validate
the semi-classical modelling framework assumed for the derivation of gravitational Hawk-
ing radiation. Unruh and Schu¨tzhold present a set of four29 jointly sufficient conditions on
the high-energy behaviour to guarantee the universality of Hawking radiation: First, that
the geometric optics only breaks down in the vicinity of the horizon. Second, that there
exists a privileged, freely falling frame. Third, that the Planckian modes start off in their
ground state. Fourth, that the evolution of these modes is adiabatic. It should thus be clear
that substantive assumptions must be in place for the semi-classical modelling framework
assumed for the derivation of gravitational Hawking radiation to be physically adequate for
black holes.
In fact, the particular theoretical arguments for universality by Unruh & Schu¨tzhold
(2005) that DTW and The´bault appeal to give us reason to doubt that they actually apply
in the world. This is because these arguments rely on the assumption of Lorentz violation at
the Planck scale30, and (conventional) experiments designed to test this claim have shown
28In the case of Hawking radiation (there are other trans-Planckian problems, e.g., the trans-Planckian
problem in inflation), Unruh and Schu¨tzhold characterise the issue as follows: “in view of the (exponential)
gravitational red-shift near the horizon, the outgoing particles of the Hawking radiation originate from
modes with extremely large (e.g., trans-Planckian) wavenumbers. As the known equations of quantum fields
in curved space-times are expected to break down at such wavenumbers, the derivation of the Hawking
radiation has the flaw that it applies a theory beyond its region of validity. This observation poses the
question of whether the Hawking effect is independent of Planckian physics or not.” (p. 1)
29DTW (mistakenly) leave out the first of these four conditions (see quote of DTW above)—probably
because these are not made so explicit by Unruh and Schu¨tzhold as are the other three conditions (referred
to as (i)-(iii)).
30More precisely, Unruh and Schu¨tzhold’s assumption of a (preferred) freely falling frame at high energies
explicitly breaks (local) Lorentz invariance:
If we assume that the usual local Lorentz invariance is broken at the Planck scale via the
introduction of preferred frames (where preferred frames are the frames in which Planckian
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that it is unlikely to be true (except under strict conditions, see for instance, Mattingly
(2005)). Although this does not affect the arguments of DTW and The´bault (since all they
require is that there be some theoretical and experimental arguments for universality, rather
than these particular ones), it shows that any theoretical claims about black holes are fallible
until faced with (conventional) experiment.
Our point is, then, simply, that it is not known if the particular modelling framework
used in the derivation of Hawking radiation actually describes black holes in the first place.
This semi-classical modelling framework, MT , with its particular assumptions and approxi-
mations, has neither been experimentally verified as actually applying to black holes nor is
there a fundamental theory of quantum gravity which could theoretically underwrite its ade-
quacy. That it has not been experimentally confirmed is what motivated analogue gravity to
begin with. And the theoretical grasp on black hole physics is not remotely as firm as that of
the analogue systems considered, e.g. terminating in a fundamental theory for which there is
independent and substantive empirical confirmation. In fact, it is precisely in the hope to get
some guidance in the search for such a theory that physicists turned to black hole physics. In
sum, by assuming that black holes are accurately described by the modelling framework from
which the derivation of Hawking radiation is a necessary consequence, DTW and The´bault
already assume the conclusion they are trying to establish—that Hawking radiation exists
in black holes. It is in this sense that they are begging the question.31
It seems to us that the literature on analogue experiment has lost focus on the kind of
observational statement that is actually of interest here, which is the claim that,
A. Anything that is accurately described by our current black hole theory (i.e., QFT
in curved spacetime)—if sufficiently realised in nature—will show multiply-realisable
radiation, X.
B. Actual black holes (not some theoretical entities but genuine stuff in the world), show
multiply-realisable radiation X.
Analogue experiments can only confirm A. It is then a further question whether actual black
holes in the world show the multiply-realisable effect X. In contrast, a conventional experi-
ment could in principle establish B, which is the target hypothesis that we want confirmed
in order to make progress on black hole physics and quantum gravity.
The DTW paper remains at the qualitative level and does not develop its argument in
the context of a particular account of confirmation. Our case so far only responds to this
qualitative argument. According to DTW, any good confirmation framework should be able
to account for analogue experiments as a means of confirmation.32 They offer a Bayesian
analysis of confirmation in the case of analogue experiments and prove theorems (in Bayesian
physics displays maximal symmetry under time-inversion, for example) then the freely falling
frame should be preferred (instead of the rest frame of the black hole, for example). (p. 9)
31See Footnote 5.
32“From our perspective, if it proves that a philosophical model of confirmation cannot accommodate
confirmation via analogue simulation at all, then this would be as much a problem for the model, as it would
for analogue simulation.” (DTW, 2017, 12).
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Figure 2: The simplified Bayesian network of Dardashti et al. (2018, Figure 2).
confirmation theory) which they maintain establishes that we can have genuine confirma-
tion through analogue experiments, i.e., that our rational credence in a hypothesis ought to
strictly increase in the light of analogue evidence. In particular, on these theorems, analogue
experiments in the lab a` la Steinhauer can confirm the existence of Hawking radiation in
astrophysical black holes. It is in this sense then that Bayesian analysis shows that ana-
logue experiments not just provide some degree of confirmation, but can provide “conclusive
confirmatory support”:
As shown by a recent analysis in terms of Bayesian confirmation theory (Dar-
dashti et al. 2016) [DHTW], given experimental demonstration of an array of
analogue Hawking effects across a variety of different mediums the degree of
confirmation conferred can be amplified very quickly. It is thus very plausible
to think of analogue experiments prospective means for providing confirmatory
support that is conclusive, rather than merely incremental. (The´bault, §1.2)
Thus, the qualitative argument in DTW gets supplemented in DHTW by a ‘quantitative’
one in terms of Bayesian confirmation theory. Let us analyse the quantitative argument.
The Bayesian analysis starts out by postulating a network representing the chain of infer-
ences found in putative cases of confirmation through analogue experiments, shown in Figure
2. A Bayesian network can be represented as a directed graph, with the variables as nodes
and the probabilistic dependencies among them as directed edges. In Figure 2, letters name
binary variables capturing whether or not a corresponding proposition is true: M related
to the proposition that the modelling framework is an empirically adequate description of
the physics of the target system at the scale of interest, A that the modelling framework
is an empirically adequate description of the physics of the analogue system at the scale
of interest, E that the empirical evidence obtains, i.e., that the phenomenon is observed,
and X that the universality arguments of the common background assumptions hold. It is
these universality arguments, which are supposed to underwrite the external validity of the
analogue experiments onto the target system. Thus, the X-factor connects the two sides
of the analogy as a parent node to both M and A, capturing the claim that, with some
non-zero probability, both the target system and the analogue system fall under the same
universality class.
DHTW now prove a theorem (their Theorem 1) that, assuming a positive probabilis-
tic dependence for each of the three edges in the network, P (M |E) > P (M), i.e., that
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the probability that the modelling framework adequately represents the relevant physics of
the target system increases if conditionalised on the evidence E. Among the three condi-
tions expressing the positive probabilistic dependencies, one is of relevance to our concern:
P (M |X) > P (M |¬X), which is equivalent to P (X|M) > P (X). This is the condition which
asserts the positive relevance of the universality arguments for the target system. Since this
appears to be an epistemically appropriately modest demand given that we already assumed
that M probabilistic depends on X when we drew the graph in Figure 2, DHTW think that
a rational agent should be compelled to accept it.
Once we grant this assumption, it then follows that analogue evidence collected in the lab
may increase the probability that the modelling framework adequately captures the relevant
black hole physics, and, consequently, that black holes emit Hawking radiation. Thus, ana-
logue experiments can putatively confirm our hypothesis concerning an inaccessible target
system. But as we have tried to demonstrate, it is not at all clear why this presupposition
should be granted: the circular dependence of conclusion on premise remains, as it must still
be presupposed that black holes are the kind of system that, with at least some non-zero prob-
ability, exhibit certain physical behaviour, which is precisely what one seeks to establish with
analogue confirmation. This is a weaker presupposition than just assuming, as the original
argument by DTW did in Step 2, that the adequacy conditions are met in black holes: now
we just posit that they possibly hold. In return, we also get much less than full confirmation:
the only conclusion we can draw from Bayesian considerations is that the rational credence
in the adequacy of the black hole modelling framework and hence in gravitational Hawking
radiation ought to be increased given the observation of analogue Hawking radiation. Thus,
this increase may be incremental, and far from providing “conclusive confirmatory support”.
In fact, it was thus already assumed that black holes at least probably fall under the
relevant universality class when the network in Figure 2 was drawn: by connecting the
variables X and M , we thereby stipulated a correlation between black holes physics and
the universality class. It is this step which presupposes (probabilistically) what we would
like to establish, viz., that black holes fall into the relevant universality class. One may
retort to this charge that all the theorem discussed above requires is that P (M) 6= 0 and
that P (M |X) is ever so slightly greater than P (M |¬X). Thus, it may be insisted, the
initially required commitment to M and to its probabilistic dependence on X is minimal
and so epistemically responsible. However, that these assumptions are not as innocent as
they appear can be seen from the following straightforward consequence of the theorems in
DHTW. Particularly by moving to multi-source confirmation (Dardashti et al., 2018, §4.2),
but in principle already in the simple case considered here (and in their §4.1), we can perform
a large number of terrestrial analogue experiments and thereby achieve an ever increasing
(but in general bounded, cf. their §4.2 and Appendix 2) degree of confirmation. Do enough
lab work and we can be ever more certain that black holes emit Hawking radiation—without
ever looking at a black hole! What we are interested in is precisely whether black holes are
appropriately modelled by the model summarised in §3.1. In the Bayesian framework, this
translates into the question of whether an edge should be drawn between X and M in the
Bayesian network in Figure 2 at all, and not just to what the priors are.
Here is another way to think about what is going on, perhaps usefully illustrated with
this example: although one can reasonably argue that a rational agent should assign non-
zero probabilities (i.e. credence) to a universality thesis (and its negation), an example
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from the philosophy of mind shows what goes wrong in analogue confirmation. Suppose the
functionalist assigns P (U) = 0.75 to the claim that any system with a certain functional
design belongs to the universality class of consciousness and the dualist assigns P (U) = 0.01.
So they will differ in priors, of course, but neither of them is permitted to choose either 0
or 1. Now we observe thousands of humans and each time, we raise the probability a
bit—we confirm that the target system (such as the population of China as a whole) has
consciousness. But of course the dualist wants to complain that no matter how many humans
we are observing, we can never learn anything about the target system from that—in a sense
observing humans does not address the research question.
At the end of the day, what is of course of interest is not just the confirmation of Hawking
radiation as a multiply-realisable theoretical claim, but as a means of confirming more general
frameworks leading to it. Whereas direct empirical confirmation of Hawking radiation also
confirms the theoretical modelling framework, analogue confirmation cannot do so, as it
already presupposes it. So, analogue confirmation cannot work due to its circularity. To spell
this out a bit more: the only candidate for actual confirmation we have of the framework of
QFT in curved spacetime so far seems to come from putative tests of (controversial) inflation,
whereas a much more direct way of probing QFT in curved spacetime would indeed consist
in testing gravitational Hawking radiation.33
To conclude: analogue confirmation does not work because the external validity of ana-
logue experiments is unable to be determined. In spite of being unable to confirm claims
about their target systems, however, these experiments are still scientifically useful. Fore-
most, analogue experiments that are internally valid can be used to establish a concrete
‘proof of concept’. They facilitate the exploration of the modelling framework, and are
heuristically profitable in that they can lead to discoveries about this framework that may
otherwise have been obscure. Additionally, they can potentially demonstrate the robustness
of the phenomena that they are supposed to be analogues of. But, we stress, that no matter
how many analogue systems are built, the robustness demonstrated can not be confirmatory
about claims regarding an unknown target system.
Conversely, putting aside the issue of analogue confirmation, the hydrodynamic exper-
iments (including, e.g., the dumb hole experiments) are of continued significance even if
one is not interested in black holes at all (and even if these systems are not in fact in the
same universality class as black holes). Shifting perspective, these experiments can instead
be thought of as conventional experiments, with target systems that are not black holes,
but rather other accessible (terrestrial) systems exhibiting the same behaviour—in this case,
they are of interest in establishing the robustness of ‘universal Hawking radiation’.
33Even gravitational Hawking radiation cannot serve in a straightforward confirmation of QFT in a curved
spacetime: as Hawking radiation can only be derived in a ‘QFT in curved spacetime’ setting under further
assumptions on the high-energy physics (to evade the prominent trans-Planckian problem), any test of it is
in fact a test of both (1) the applicability of the QFT in curved spacetime framework, and (2) any proposed
trans-Planckian physics behaviour used to evade the trans-Planckian problem (that the Hawking radiation
needs to involve a cut-off of higher than Planck-scale energy behaviour), i.e., Hawking radiation can only
serve as a test for both at the same time.
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6 Conclusion
A sufficient condition for an experiment or simulation to be potentially confirmatory is its
being testable with respect to its target system. Material models and simulations, which
(like analogue experiments) rely on analogy, can (we assume) be potentially confirmatory in
the cases where they can be compared to their target system, and this testing can provide the
arguments for their external validity. In those cases of material models and simulation where
the target system is experimentally accessible, the fact that they can yield confirmation is
reflective of the ability of the models and simulations to be tested (and not an indication that
they have somehow transcended their categorisation as analogue models or simulations).
Analogue experiments, on the other hand, are, by definition, not testable with respect
to their target systems: experiments can only be made on one side of the analogy. While
DTW and The´bault attempt to demonstrate that there may be other ways of establishing
the external validity of an analogue experiment, these cannot overcome the key limitation
on analogue experiments: the frontier of physics. For an analogue experiment to potentially
confirm the existence of some phenomenon in an inaccessible system, on the basis of a formal
analogy between the modelling frameworks MS and MT describing, respectively, the source
and target systems (plus experimental observation of an analogous phenomenon in the source
system under the relevant conditions, plus other MEEGA), it presupposes that MT actually
describes the target system. But analogue experiments cannot tell us that MT actually
describes the target system. And neither can arguments for multiple realisability, whether
theoretical or empirical.
Owing to the tenuousness of the connection between dumb holes and black holes, the
evidence that dumb hole experiments provide for the existence of Hawking radiation in black
holes is not of a different epistemic sort than other instances of analogical reasoning. This
means that if one believes that analogue experiments are capable of providing confirmation,
then one should also be open to analogies as being able to increase credence in a hypothesis.
Conversely, if one does not think that mere analogies yield confirmation, then neither do
analogue experiments (after all, they necessarily involve analogical reasoning). We thus
claim that analogue models of Hawking radiation are no more or less confirmatory than the
analogy between thermodynamics and black hole thermodynamics, for example.
In short, assuming that analogue experiments cannot yield truly empirical confirmation,
we argued that DTW beg the very question they set out to answer: the analogical reasoning
necessary to get from an experimental result concerning an analogue system to a hypothesis
regarding an inaccessible target system must presuppose that the formally same modelling
framework applies to the inaccessible target system. This circularity is vicious given that
analogue confirmation of gravitational Hawking radiation rests on the validity of QFT in
curved spacetime, as well as the universality of the Hawking effect (i.e., its independence
of high-energy effects), and that both of these hypotheses are to be tested by Hawking
radiation in the first place. Thus, analogue confirmation does not seem to provide more
than a consistency check for gravitational Hawking radiation. In other words, the reasoning
involved in the theoretical argument around why gravitational black holes radiate can only
show that if the formalism is indeed applicable to black holes there would indeed be radiation.
That the formalism is applicable to black holes—the real issue at stake—, can however not
be settled by analogue confirmation, which leaves analogue confirmation, in the end, as an
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instance of analogue reasoning.
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